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I. Preliminaries
Before committing suicide, Othello says, 
“Speak of me as I am; . . . speak of one who 
loved not wisely, but too well.”1 Thinking of 
his love for Desdemona, we are not likely to 
agree with his assessment that he loved her 
“too well,” especially if loving well is sup-
posed to require some kind of dependability 
or concern for her well-being; we would be 
loath even to grant that he loved her “too 
much.” Othello’s love for his wife seems, 
rather, to have been firmly subordinated to 
his love for his honor. Perhaps, then, his 
statement could be saved by saying that it 
was his honor that he loved too well, and that 
in devoting himself so completely to it, he 
did not love wisely. He needed a better way 
of coordinating his two concerns, one that 
wouldn’t give him cause for regret—a way 
of loving well that was also wise.
 Whatever the merits of this reading of 
Othello, it raises an important question. 
To the extent that love and care are central 
ethical concerns, it is important to identify 
what would constitute loving or caring well. 
What qualities or virtues are called for in 
this? One popular answer is that loving 
well requires that an agent’s loves possess 
a certain kind of synchronic unity regarding 
what she loves. According to Alasdair Ma-
cIntyre, invoking Jane Austen’s treatment of 
the changeability of love in novels such as 
Persuasion, love is the part of human life in 
which “one specific and central, although all 
too often unrecognized, virtue has its place,”2 
the virtue of “constancy.” Harry Frankfurt, on 
the other hand, assigns a similar perfective 
role to “wholeheartedness,” which, though 
applicable to a wide range of motivational 
factors, primarily refers to a kind of lack of 
reservation regarding what we love. Both of 
these indicate that someone’s love possesses 
a certain consistency. Such a person’s love or 
concern for someone or something does not 
quickly change or vary with mood or season. 
I will take it, then, that there is some kind 
of quality of unity residing in the neighbor-
hood of these, which I will follow Frankfurt 
in calling “wholeheartedness” and which is 
perfective of love and part of loving well. 
The main questions I will ask in this paper 
are these: how should this state of unity be 
defined, what does it consist in, and under 
what conditions is it worthwhile to pursue it?
 We might first ask: what strikes us as desir-
able about wholeheartedness? A certain sort 
of argument, frequently used by Frankfurt, 
goes as follows. Loving someone or some-
thing involves, among other things, treating 
it as a final end of some kind, in a fairly per-
sistent manner. Loving a person, for example, 
is supposed to involve treating her good as 
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over some significant stretch of time. Some-
one who is not wholehearted, however, may 
act lovingly toward her beloved at one time, 
and at another anxiously resist and reject the 
promptings of love. Such a person experi-
ences a particular kind of problem in loving: 
she is divided against herself, so that like 
Othello she both supports and undermines 
her most important concerns.
 Another kind of argument, drawing on 
Augustine, goes as follows. Someone who 
is not wholehearted finds it difficult to re-
ally, fully make up her mind to pursue the 
good. Even when she is very certain of how 
the good stands, other concerns pull at her 
attention and her will in a way that distracts 
her and interferes with her attempts to live in 
accordance with it. What she cares about, or 
the manner in which she cares about it, does 
not cohere with the good as she conceives it, 
and as a result she continually interferes with 
her most important concerns. Someone who 
is wholehearted, on the contrary, is wholly 
engaged with the good, loving it without the 
inner conflict that besets the double-minded 
person, not hindering herself from achieving 
and enjoying the good as she sees it. Her con-
cerns cohere with one another, and she gives 
to each its due, unified by her one great and 
central love for the good.
 These two arguments each highlight a com-
mon aspect of wholeheartedness: it perfects 
love by ensuring that, in a specific respect, 
we are undivided; applied to love, it means 
that we are wholly involved in our concern 
for what we love or care about, without inner 
resistance to acting on its behalf, enjoying 
what we love to the utmost and achieving all 
that we can on its behalf.
 The two arguments, however, also appeal to 
distinct and divergent conceptions of whole-
heartedness. One of their points of conflict 
provides a useful entrée into the subject. 
Frankfurt takes exception to Kierkegaard’s 
statement that to be wholehearted is “to will 
one thing.”3 He says that wholeheartedness 
does not “literally” require us to will just 
one thing by, say, pursuing a single ideal or 
loving a single person. Those who do this 
“are only being single-minded. . . . What 
counts is the quality of the will—that is, its 
integrity—not the quantity of its objects.”4 
What matters isn’t how many objects she 
cares about, but whether her attitude toward 
them is consistent. Someone who loves mu-
sic, chess, and her mother does not thereby 
become ambivalent or double-minded. Over 
a certain range of cases, this is accurate 
enough, but Frankfurt moves to his conclu-
sion too quickly. It is, after all, not plain 
our final ends must cohere in this way, as 
Frankfurt himself admits elsewhere, and not 
plain that this is the sort of “willing” involved 
in “willing one thing.”5 We can also speak 
of someone “willing” to live in accordance 
with a certain standard, to live out a certain 
conception of life, or to follow some central 
love, willing this in such a way that all other 
interests and concerns are subordinated to 
or otherwise integrated within it. A person 
who is wholehearted in this sense wills just 
one thing, a conception of how to live that 
comprehends and authoritatively structures 
all of her other concerns.
 The conception of wholeheartedness I shall 
provide below concerns this kind of willing. 
Frankfurt clearly draws inspiration from this 
older view while also seeking to correct it; I 
will do the opposite, and though frankly ow-
ing much to Frankfurt’s work, use this time 
to develop a classical model of wholehearted-
ness and say something about the desirability 
of pursuing it.
II. A Definition of (Classical) 
Wholeheartedness
 I begin by offering the following, somewhat 
skeletal, definition of classical wholeheart-
edness: Wholeheartedness is the state of an 
agent who possesses undivided internal com-
mitment to her conception of the good.6 This 















































 Internal commitment is the kind of commit-
ment we remark upon in a committed teacher 
or committed friend. These individuals are 
bound by their own dispositions and attach-
ments to grant these objects importance in 
their deliberations. Internal commitment is 
not the externally binding obligation that 
holds someone who has obligated herself to 
do something, but the internal bond imposed 
on someone by her caring about something.7
 Love is the most potent and characteristic 
example of human commitment, and its sway 
over our thoughts, feelings, and actions is 
especially powerful. Augustine uses the 
metaphor of weight to describe the power of 
love upon the will: “My weight is my love. 
Wherever I am carried, my love is carrying 
me.”8 Metaphysical background aside, this 
is one of the clearest points of agreement 
between Frankfurt and Augustine, and it 
is worthwhile to explain four propositions 
that form the background to both pictures 
of wholeheartedness. Certain features of 
love establish it as a stable feature of our 
lives that is free, but beyond our immediate 
control: (1) It is not generally within our 
power to initiate love, which often arises 
without directly choosing it; (2) once we 
begin to love, it is not generally within our 
immediate power to cease loving, and even 
with extended effort often difficult to do 
so; (3) insofar as certain courses of action 
impact what we love, loving something can 
constrain our will by making engaging in 
or refraining from certain courses of action 
unthinkable to us. This could make love 
seem a kind of prison, Sappho’s “bittersweet 
creature against which nothing can be done,”9 
but although we cannot control love, (4) love 
is less an external constraint upon the will 
than a “configuration of the will” whereby 
the will binds itself to certain ends, so that 
we never feel less constrained than when we 
pursue what we love.10 It is in virtue of (4) 
that love is internal, while (2) and (3) make 
love a form of internal commitment, and it 
is (1) that, conjoined with these, can make 
the phenomenon appear rather threatening,
 Care functions in ways broadly similar to 
love, at least concerning its hold upon the will. 
I will speak of the two of these as “concerns,” 
to avoid the awkwardness of constantly refer-
ring to both. These concerns, taken together, 
largely define our internal commitments, and 
I will use the term “volitional state” to refer to 
the state of an agent’s internal commitments, 
that is, generally to mean the state of an agent’s 
will insofar as her ends are defined by what she 
loves and cares about.
 I use the phrase “conception of the good” to 
specify someone’s conception of a life worth 
living. Although someone’s conception of 
the good includes evaluative elements, the 
good as I see it is largely made up of what 
someone loves and cares about—that is, 
by her concerns, and as such may be very 
personal. Such concerns may themselves be 
normatively loaded in some respects, as I 
think they are, but I will not dwell on whether 
this is so or what significance it might have. 
Someone’s conception of the good also in-
cludes what she believes that she has reason 
to love or care about and guidelines for how 
to care about certain objects. It is probably 
quite common for a person’s conception of 
the good to consist in no more than a certain 
way of treating the collection of her concerns, 
without these being related to one another in 
any systematic fashion. She cares about her 
family members and her friends, about certain 
kinds of recreation, about certain kinds of 
music or books, about her health and her life, 
and her conception of the good may just be 
an idea of the collection of these faring well, 
with a largely unknown implicit ordering.
III. What Does  
Wholeheartedness Correct?
 It is, however, a good question to ask just 
what it means to say that someone is either 
“wholehearted” or, on the contrary, “double-
minded.” There are two principal points that 
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must be addressed. The account must first 
specify the kinds of demands that love and 
other concerns make and then clarify how these 
demands may render someone’s volitional state 
either coherent or divided and fragmented.
 I will begin with the fact that our concerns 
make claims upon us: they claim, in an obvi-
ous way, time, resources, attention, and action. 
But one concern may also make claims upon 
other concerns, directly. Consider how one 
concern may condition another. If a person 
loves X and loves Y, and she loves X as a 
means to or part of loving Y, or if her love for 
Y limits or guides her love for X, then her love 
for Y may be said to condition her love for X. 
For example: someone might love a tool that 
enables her to engage in something else she 
loves, if it performs its function well, and so in 
this way a painter might love a certain brand of 
paintbrush or a fencer love a certain sword; a 
lover might love her beloved’s voice or sense 
of humor or another aspect as part of loving 
him, or again may love a letter written to her 
by him or even a child she has had with him, 
as part of loving him; someone’s love for her 
family may limit the importance she gives her 
love for teaching and for her students, or vice 
versa; or someone’s religious devotion may 
provide ideals of friendship or marriage that 
guide how she loves her friends or spouse.
 From this it follows that we may have 
conditioning concerns, conditioned con-
cerns, unconditioned concerns, mutually 
conditioning concerns, surd concerns that 
neither condition nor are conditioned, and, of 
course, conflicting concerns. I will call these 
claims that our concerns make upon one an-
other “demands.” Our concerns will conflict 
whenever one concern demands to condition 
another in a manner or respect resisted by the 
second, and the conflict will be most intense 
if both concerns demand to condition the 
other while resisting being conditioned in 
turn. Concerns that do not currently conflict 
may be either integrated or unintegrated. Con-
cerns are integrated when their harmonious 
relationship is well-defined, in terms of how 
each concern conditions the other concern. 
Concerns are unintegrated if at present their 
relationship is undefined and may yet develop 
into a state of conflict or integration. When a 
person’s concerns are unintegrated, she may 
find them conflicting in various particular 
circumstances, due to her current uncertainty 
regarding their relationship for her will.
 Now, within this realm of potential conflict 
among concerns, we find the domain within 
which wholeheartedness has its application. 
Wholeheartedness, as defined above, requires 
someone to possess internal commitment to 
her conception of the good, commitment that 
is undivided. Now it is possible for someone 
to simply lack commitment to the good as she 
conceives it, to fail to pursue the good because 
she doesn’t care about it. The wholehearted 
person will not, of course, fail in this way. She 
cares about her conception of the good. But 
insofar as we speak of wholeheartedness as 
“perfecting” love, it doesn’t concern lack of 
commitment. It concerns, as Frankfurt said, 
the quality or integrity of commitment, and 
corrects a different problem that someone 
might possess in pursing the good: achieving 
unity within the structure of her concerns.
 For consider what occurs when concerns 
make conflicting claims or demands. We can 
distinguish several different kinds of conflict 
among these, which I will treat in order of 
increasing severity.
 Conflicts of scheduling involve two or more 
concerns that conflict because each claims 
something—time, money, attention, physical 
presence, etc.—that we cannot adequately 
supply to both simultaneously. Think, for 
example, of a child who loves both video 
games and good grades, or an adult who loves 
both baseball and her family, or both reading 
and kayaking. Such conflicts may usually be 
adequately resolved through planning or the 
exercise of judgment regarding a particular 
occasion, or in the last instance by following 















































tation, when he said “we can make ourselves 
whole only by accepting our partiality, by liv-
ing within our limits, by being human—not 
by trying to be gods.”11 There is no intrinsic 
conflict between the two loves in such cases, 
and the conflict is created only by our finitude. 
Someone whose concerns conflict in this way, 
who fails to show care for their mutual com-
bination, will be generally dissatisfied with 
the way that she neglects one or the other of 
these, or both of them in succession. If she is 
especially attached to her concerns and they 
are particularly resistant to being conditioned, 
she may find the problem difficult to solve.
 Conflicts of character arise when each of 
two or more concerns requires a specific kind 
of character, and the specific excellences 
or virtues or traits relative to each concern 
conflict with one another, so that time and 
attention devoted to one tends to make it 
harder to properly appreciate or engage with 
the other. Each concern therefore demands 
that the other be limited in its claims. The 
qualities necessary for appreciating one kind 
of music may, for example, inhibit someone 
from appreciating another kind of music, and 
loving one pursuit might demand spontaneity, 
but another steadiness and deliberateness. 
The classical dispute between the active 
and the contemplative lives illustrates the 
same problem. Pursuing a political life may 
require the development of dispositions and 
tastes, even if these are genuine excellences, 
that are incompatible with those demanded 
by the contemplative life of the philosopher 
who is withdrawn from the hustle and bustle 
of the world. In some cases, such conflicts are 
personality or temperament relative; it is only 
persons with a certain kind of natural charac-
ter who experience the conflict. In other cases, 
the difference seems to be deeper, and to lie 
in the nature of the characters themselves. 
Someone seeking to resolve a conflict of char-
acter needs to allow one concern to be given 
clear priority (either giving the other a sec-
ondary role or abandoning it completely) or 
otherwise fail to care for either well—because 
while her concerns draw her again and again 
to the two different objects, her character will 
never be suited to either. Here, too, someone 
must recognize the conditions of finitude, and 
practice the wisdom of self-limitation.
 Conflicts of identity concern the good in 
general or one’s particular vocation. In these 
conflicts, two or more loves each demand 
to define one’s life as a central love, that is, 
they each specify a distinct and fairly com-
plete conception of the good (or at least the 
architecture for such a conception) or a fairly 
specific identity for someone to pursue and 
practice. Their completeness prevents them 
from being combined. Examples of such con-
flicts include Augustine’s struggle between 
his pursuing a life of power and pleasure and 
his pursuing a life of contemplation, or the 
conflict we may suppose or hope Gauguin 
to have experienced between caring for his 
family and developing his vocation for art 
in Polynesia. Such definitions of life often 
specify different characters, and so create 
conflict on that level as well. These conflicts 
of identity may be very sharp, but with the 
exception of the conflicts I will mention just 
below, they generally involve genuine goods 
and can be resolved if one rival or set of rivals 
is subordinated to another. A life of contem-
plation can include action, pleasure, and 
honor, even if it cannot grant them a place as 
life-defining goods or goals, and most artists 
find better ways to combine art and family 
than Gauguin did. Someone pursuing too 
many definitions of life will, naturally, find it 
impossible to live a coherent life, constantly 
undermining and betraying her own purposes, 
unless and until she makes up her mind which 
identity to pursue and practice as her mode 
of pursuing the good.
 Conflicts of exclusive values do not allow 
for such solutions. In such conflicts, one love 
demands that what the other treats as valuable 
not be allowed to function as an end for action 
at all. These pose sharp disagreement about 
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the nature of the good, such that to commit to 
one entails rejecting what is most important 
to the other. For example, benevolence and 
sadism—a general love of benefiting human 
beings, and a general love of inflicting pain 
upon them—cannot be coherently combined 
in one heart. At a more philosophical level, 
someone may be attracted to both Nietzsche’s 
“revaluation of values” and to Christianity, 
may love certain aspects of each, but the two 
cannot in any meaningful way be combined 
with one another. In both cases, what is cher-
ished in one is despised in the other. To love 
one demands outlawing the other; but to love 
both at the same time must often mean hating 
and despising oneself, and perhaps revealing 
oneself only in one’s dreams. Such loves 
demand decisive exclusion of the other.
 Whenever at least one concern in one of 
these conflicts forms part of an agent’s con-
ception of the good—and in the majority of 
cases, both concerns are part of it—then this 
conflict will divide an agent’s commitment to 
her conception of the good. When both are 
parts of her conception, then it is the incoher-
ence of her conception that divides her against 
herself. Such conflicts pose what I term the 
fragmentation problem. A divided person’s 
will is fragmented between ends in such a 
way as to make it impossible to fully will her 
conception of the good. It is the internal com-
mitment involved in love and care that prevents 
us from viewing the fragmentation problem 
as generally equivalent to, or solvable in the 
same way as, problems regarding plurality and 
incommensurability within the good.12
 Someone facing the fragmentation problem 
will find her commitment to the good divided 
by a plurality of incompatible concerns, pull-
ing at her will, attention, and affections. As 
Frankfurt has said, she suffers from “an inco-
herent sort of greed,” wishing “to have things 
both ways.”13 As he also says, this is not a 
state with which any agent “can possibly be 
satisfied.”14 To the degree that someone suffers 
from fragmentation problems between rival 
concerns involving her conception of the good, 
her practical life must be dissatisfying, inco-
herent, and disappointing to her; her deepest 
concerns draw her in different and incompat-
ible directions, and she undermines her own 
good through her wandering vacillations.
IV. Why Utilize  
the Classical Conception?
 Someone might object to the “classical con-
ception” as represented here for at least two 
reasons. First, why should we favor it over 
Frankfurt’s view? Why should we focus upon 
an agent’s conception of the good in this way, 
and why about an agent’s total volitional state 
rather than her wholeheartedness about any 
of her various individual concerns? Second, 
doesn’t the classical conception here rather 
change the subject? If Othello’s goal was to 
love Desdemona well, then will not the ap-
propriate solution focus upon those qualities 
perfective of just such a particular love, rather 
than clouding the issue with talk of agents’ 
conceptions of the good and the like?
 We should adopt the classical conception 
over Frankfurt’s because it possesses two 
significant, and related, comparative advan-
tages over his. It operates at a deeper level 
of explanation and therefore offers a more 
fundamental analysis of wholeheartedness, 
and, because it operates at this level, it ad-
dresses the fragmentation problem, a problem 
Frankfurt’s treatment obscures.
 Frankfurt frequently speaks as if there is no 
good explanation for why some people are 
ambivalent about their concerns and some are 
not.15 Why should someone dither in this way 
over committing to a concern, going back and 
forth between accepting and rejecting it? He 
says, somewhat mysteriously, that according to 
Augustine, ambivalence is an effect of original 
sin.16 What could the connection be between 
vacillation and sin, even original sin? The mys-
teries of original sin do not disappear when we 
turn to Augustine, but this particular obscurity 















































ity in its fallen state is such as to love in a disor-
dered way; we love some things more than we 
should, others less, and we do not love in the 
right manner. Worse, love is such as to bind the 
will even after we have come to think better of 
it.17 Ambivalence is therefore not fundamental, 
but the result of being persistently drawn to 
conflicting ends. Thus, whereas both Frank-
furt and Augustine refer to ambivalence and 
fragmentation as a “disease,”18 Frankfurt seems 
content to describe the symptoms. Frankfurt’s 
view therefore obscures the fundamental dif-
ference between a vacillation that arises from 
uncertainty and lack of knowledge (should I 
commit, even in ignorance of possible conse-
quences?) and a vacillation that truly arises 
within the heart of the agent (how can I do this, 
knowing how it will impact such-and-such?), 
assimilating these to each other and obscuring 
the particular defect of agency that produces 
irrational ambivalence.
 Thus, Frankfurt’s conception obscures 
the importance of solving the fragmentation 
problem for wholeheartedness. Wholeheart-
edness is praised in the highest terms, but 
he provides no discussion of the necessity, 
if we are to be wholehearted, of making our 
concerns coherent with one another. Local 
ambivalence, when it does not involve simple 
factual uncertainties, generally reflects failure 
to solve the fragmentation problem. When 
someone fails to love well, she needs to ask 
what else she cares about, and how it relates 
to what she fails at.
 The second objection asks whether the 
classical conception addresses the original 
point, that is, loving well; for it might seem 
as if in providing this account, I have changed 
the subject from the original topic. Does the 
question of how someone like Othello might 
love a Desdemona well not concern those 
qualities called for and manifested in loving 
some particular individual or object well, and 
not require making the agent’s conception of 
the good central to the account? But Othello, 
let us remember, spoke of loving “too well.” 
Whatever the poet meant in writing this, mak-
ing excessive sacrifices for the sake of one 
love ordinarily involves a terrible mistake. 
Even when it does not lead to obviously griev-
ous consequences, such misguided devotion 
strains our relationship with what else we 
love and can warp or distort the activity or 
relationship itself through misunderstanding 
the significance and nature of the goods at 
stake. Those who dress up their dogs and 
lavish them with clothing or accessories they 
are incapable of appreciating do not really 
love their dogs better than those who do not 
do such things; one senses that what such 
individuals really want is a purpose to devote 
themselves to, and Fido has merely become 
the target for purpose. Loving too well is not, 
then, loving even better than loving well; it is 
loving less well. Insofar as wholeheartedness 
is part of loving well, it isn’t inappropriate to 
shift to a wider perspective than that afforded 
by a particular love. When one love is granted 
its demands because it is good for them to 
be granted, or gives way to the demands of 
another love because it is in his case good 
that it give way, this is loving well. Is this 
correction not exactly what Othello needed?
 One must look to the agent’s total conception 
of the good, because love cannot be whole-
hearted if our acting on behalf of what we love 
is regarded as cause for regret and repentance. 
Someone might face a difficult dilemma and 
regret choosing the option she did, without 
repentance; she would do the same again, 
because it was the least bad and most accept-
able solution to the difficulty. But the one who 
regrets and repents is not wholehearted.
V. The Integration of Concerns
 Wholeheartedness, then, perfects love (and 
care) insofar as it integrates those concerns 
that are parts of our conception of the good 
and protects them from conflicts from with-
out, thereby liberating an agent’s powers to 
be fully engaged in the pursuit and practice 
of the good, as she conceives it.
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 It is common, not only to the classical 
conception of wholeheartedness, but to the 
classical conception of agency itself (as 
developed and utilized by authors such as 
Plato and Aristotle), to suppose that an agent 
typically possesses some one central object of 
concern, which I have here called a “central 
love,” such as pleasure, honor, and contem-
plation. Such an object integrates concern not 
only by acting as a standard of goodness but 
also by acting in the manner I have ascribed 
to central loves, being granted the right to 
condition all other concerns. Someone who 
unifies her heart in this way seems, more 
than anyone, to have good reason to claim to 
possess undivided internal commitment to 
her conception of the good.
 But is the integration of concerns around 
some single object the only manner in 
which someone may become wholehearted? 
“Surely,” one might object, “one might do as 
well with plurality of concerns, if only these 
cohere with her conception of the good and 
with one another?” I admit that someone with 
a plurality of coherent concerns could avoid 
conflict, if these conditions were met. There 
are, however, considerations that make it 
doubtful whether such a person is genuinely 
wholehearted.
 One must wonder where such a person will 
find the volitional power to achieve and main-
tain such a condition of coherence—by what 
means are her concerns arranged into such an 
orderly state? We know what it is for someone 
to give herself to some one concern, to make 
one great devotion to an ideal or cause, and to 
achieve wholeheartedness by that means, rare 
though it may be. Such was Abraham. When 
such a person considers conflicts among her 
less central concerns, her conception of the 
good may either supply an answer to the con-
flict or not. If it does, then she knows what to 
do, and resolves the conflict wholeheartedly; 
if it does not, then her choice of resolution is 
not important for her wholeheartedness. She 
makes up her mind for one thing, and does 
the rest within the framework of that concern. 
Perhaps even such individuals as this rarely 
or never achieve complete wholeheartedness; 
still, they seem the best situated to do so and 
make the best progress toward becoming so. 
Such a path to wholeheartedness is not avail-
able to someone who maintains a plurality of 
ultimate concerns.
 Still, beyond this provisional argument, 
which is wholly focused upon the situation 
of one who is seeking wholeheartedness 
rather than the one who possesses it, there 
are reasons to think that wholeheartedness 
may be more difficult to attain or maintain for 
someone with a plurality of concerns than for 
someone who possesses some single central 
object of concern. I hope to provide a fuller 
account of the argument for this at a later date, 
but for the present, I will provide a simpler, 
and much briefer, version of the argument.
 Suppose someone possesses no single 
central concern that unifies her practical 
life. Instead, she possesses a plurality of 
such ultimate concerns. Her concerns and 
her conception of the good are in harmony, 
and furthermore these concerns do not at 
present conflict with one another. She then 
possesses undivided internal commitment 
to her conception of the good. Her deepest 
concerns possess two important features: they 
are persistent sources of energy for agency, 
because of how they establish their objects 
as “gravitational” forces in her life, and they 
provide her deepest practical premises for 
action. These features render her continuing 
unity uncertain. If circumstances press her 
concerns so that they conflict, it is not clear 
how she can resolve the conflict, or even 
end it, and the outcome of such conflicts 
retrospectively renders her earlier, apparent 
wholeheartedness suspect. Her volitional 
state is like that of a political state that lacks 
commonly accepted standards for legitimacy, 
such as majoritarian rule within constitu-
tional limits. In such a state, when matters 















































things stand for their own reasons, but when 
circumstances force it outside the realm one 
faction deems legitimate, its lack of unity 
shines forth.
 The volitional state of someone who 
doesn’t lack such a central concern is unified 
because each concern “accepts” the right of 
the central concern to condition its claims. 
It does not follow immediately, and may not 
follow at all, that this central concern must 
also be the person’s highest concern, though 
central concerns have often been thought to 
be such. What is essential isn’t its status as a 
summum bonum but its possessing the right 
to condition other concerns. Such a concern 
may not be a highest end, either—not in 
the traditional sense, anyway. It might be 
an ideal or principle of some kind that we 
would hesitate to describe as an end. But by 
hypothesis we are considering a person whose 
volitional state contains no element playing 
such a role. Her heart is not set upon virtue, 
or the categorical imperative, or universal 
benevolence, or any other unifying ideal. 
What, then, of her?
 Suppose that she has just two ultimate con-
cerns—her love for philosophy and for her 
family. A good long time proceeds without 
difficulty while she devotes herself to these 
two concerns wholeheartedly, but then she 
reaches a point when her circumstances press 
her concerns against one another. Perhaps the 
difficulties created by a poor job market force 
her to choose to neglect one or the other. She 
will possess two sets of first practical prem-
ises to work from, which require different 
courses of action, and each set of premises 
will be powerful to her, to the point that she 
will find it difficult, or perhaps impossible, to 
settle upon any course of action that she will 
not later regret and despise herself for taking. 
So, suppose that now she decides on a course 
of action, to neglect her vocation or her fam-
ily; whence will come the volitional resolve 
to effect her decision? She has no basis within 
her conception of the good for favoring one 
over the other. Shall her concerns give way 
to her decision, or will she lack the commit-
ment to coordinate her concerns? Does she 
make a decision at all, or only fool herself 
into thinking she has? Perhaps instead she 
will patch together a series of compromises 
between her different concerns, but if cir-
cumstances are truly pressing her concerns 
against one another, then it is hard to see how 
such compromises will not become only so 
many more causes of unhappiness in her life, 
as she seems to provide neither concern with 
the devotion it requires. Her current division 
makes us regard her earlier apparent unity 
with suspicion; a fortuitous lack of conflict 
hid a dormant division.
 It therefore seems that to pursue whole-
heartedness requires pursuing a kind of 
wholeness and integration that involves 
granting some unifying concern the right to 
condition all other concerns.
VI. The Pursuit  
of Wholeheartedness
 Is wholeheartedness a virtue? This question 
seems hard to answer. If wholeheartedness is 
a virtue, then there should be no such thing 
as a wholehearted viciousness, and some 
important authors have argued this, such as 
Plato and Kierkegaard. They have argued 
that there is some feature of human agency or 
human ends such that the only end that one 
can pursue wholeheartedly is the good itself; 
one can never pursue a false conception of 
the good wholeheartedly. There will always 
be some sort of remaining discordance or dis-
harmony “in the soul.” This, I think, is a hard 
question, and answering it would require not 
only making substantive arguments regarding 
the content of the good and our relationship 
to it, but also important investigations into the 
metaphysics and epistemology of value. I am 
inclined to agree with these writers that there 
is no wholehearted vice, but I am not very sure 
of this, and I believe that in any case someone 
can make very good progress toward achieving 
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wholehearted commitment to a very unsound 
conception of the good. In place of this ques-
tion, therefore, I will substitute and answer 
another, more practical question: when should 
we pursue wholeheartedness?
 Consider Abraham as he figures in the fa-
mous Binding of Isaac. Near the end of Abra-
ham’s life, after God has fulfilled his promise 
to give Abraham offspring, God orders Abra-
ham to go to Mount Moriah and offer his son 
Isaac as a burnt offering to him. At the last 
moment, after Abraham has bound Isaac and 
reached for the knife, God orders Abraham to 
release his son. Philosophers have discussed 
this story for a variety of reasons; I mention 
it here because it seems to provide a notable 
example of wholeheartedness, in its difficulty 
and moral ambiguity. Abraham, despite lov-
ing his son, was nonetheless so completely 
devoted to God that he did not withhold his 
son from him. Some have taken this as a proof 
of Abraham’s virtue, others, as proof of his 
wickedness; Abraham, for his part, seemed to 
have no doubts. It is not plain what exactly 
Abraham expects to come from sacrificing 
his son. He tells Isaac that God will provide 
the sacrifice, and the author of Hebrews says 
that Abraham expected God to raise Isaac 
from the dead, if he should slay him. But what 
seems plain is that Abraham follows God 
wholeheartedly; he displays no hesitancy at 
any moment, and there is no question when 
the objects of his concern conflict which he 
favors, no doubt that even his love for his son 
cannot divide his heart against his decisive 
commitment to and trust in God.
 Is such devotion virtuous? If Othello il-
lustrates the disease of double-mindedness, 
Abraham may make us leery of the cure. 
For even if we think that Abraham’s judg-
ment was correct, it isn’t clear that someone 
could not have such trust and wholehearted 
devotion where judgment is incorrect. In 
that case, if even a vicious Abraham can be 
described as wholehearted, then it is not so 
clear that wholeheartedness is desirable, or a 
virtue. Paying a little attention to the lessons 
of history, especially that of the most recently 
completed century, shows all too well the 
dangers of wholehearted devotion to ideol-
ogy; one often wishes that people had shown 
rather less wholeheartedness, because greater 
ambivalence would have made it harder to 
offer up common decency as a sacrifice.
 Under what conditions, then, is it rational 
to pursue the kind of volitional integration 
involved in wholeheartedness? When some-
one is wholehearted, this includes trust in the 
goodness of her conception of the good that 
makes her other concerns complacent. This 
seems especially plain when wholeheartedness 
is achieved through a central unifying concern. 
When her trust is misplaced, it is these other, 
more obviously desirable, concerns that pay 
the price. In Abraham’s example, everything 
depends upon whether he was right to trust 
his solution to the fragmentation problem, 
elevating devotion to God above all else. For, 
if he was wrong in this, wrong to be certain of 
God’s promise, wrong that he would certainly 
have descendents through Isaac, then Abraham 
would have had as much to regret as Othello. 
Hence, whether wholeheartedness is desirable 
for someone depends to a great degree upon 
whether her conception of the good is sound.
 We might, then, be tempted to follow this 
conclusion with another, that wholehearted-
ness should be pursued only to the degree to 
which someone has warrant for thinking her 
conception of the good is sound. It is best to 
stand back, first of all, and perhaps make no 
firm commitments to any conception of the 
good, none of which provide the questioning 
agent with warrant sufficient for certainty. 
If no particular good or potential object of 
concern seems sufficiently compelling, then 
why not engage with a variety of goods and 
concerns, without the hope or monomania 
that marks wholeheartedness, at least until 
the goodness of some conception of the good 
















































 But this would be too quick; commitment to 
a way of life is sometimes, as Stephen Evans 
argues, an all-or-nothing affair, akin to pursu-
ing marriage or therapy for depression.19 One 
may lack sufficient warrant to be certain that 
the therapy or the marriage will be successful, 
but halfhearted commitment to either is likely 
to undermine its success. Similarly, to pursue a 
way of life halfheartedly can fall short of pur-
suing it at all, and can preclude a meaningful 
testing of its claims. There may therefore be no 
means of acquiring such warrant before mak-
ing up one’s mind to pursue a particular way 
of life, and trusting in its goodness. It therefore 
seems that, as Evans concludes, “wholehearted 
commitment, far from precluding an honest 
test of risky commitment, is sometimes a con-
dition for such a test.”20 The goods internal to a 
way of life may be either so difficult to attain, 
or so dependent upon trust, that halfhearted 
engagement is incapable of unveiling them.21
 Someone who therefore wishes to solve 
the fragmentation problem by articulating 
and committing herself to a conception of the 
good that resolves the conflicts between her 
different concerns will have to do so without 
full information or warrant sufficient for cer-
tainty. She may not know what falsehoods, 
misinterpretations, and self-deceptions her 
evaluation is subject to. Her community can 
provide some check against these failures, 
but communities themselves can fail, and 
“in times of cultural flux and aporia” (as 
Matthew Crawford says) “it is not clear what 
‘our rules’ are,” because there may seem to be 
no recognizable communal standards to rely 
upon;22 her decision may, in fact, partially 
consist in deciding which and what kind of 
communities she wishes to identify herself 
with. She must, then, commit in trust.
 This does not mean that her decision to 
seek wholeheartedness must be arbitrary or 
blind. Her decision may have rational war-
rant, but warrant insufficient for certainty, 
and may be based in insight, but insight that 
falls short of understanding. Her decision, 
then, may be reasoned, it may be rational, 
and it may be responsive to genuine goods, 
but it is not without risk. Nor does it imply 
that her decision is made once and for all, if 
following her commitment, or through her 
commitment, she discovers her conception’s 
unsoundness, any more than someone who 
commits wholeheartedly to a method of treat-
ment is incapable of later rejecting it—though 
one hopes we will correct ourselves before 
imposing so great a cost upon ourselves as 
an Abraham whose trust was not rewarded 
would have suffered. We pursue our concep-
tions of the good as good, and so even the 
wholehearted agent is free to break with a 
conception once she discovers that it is, in 
certain respects, bad or incoherent.
 Hence although someone may never have 
certainty regarding these matters, if she 
possesses sufficient reason for favoring one 
conception over another, and thinks it likely 
to lead her well, then she ought to accept the 
risk inherent in finitude, and commit herself 
to it. What this degree of warrant consists in, 
I will not here attempt to specify. The more 
severe her double-mindedness, however, and 
the greater her fragmentation problem, the 
more pressing it is for her to do so. In such 
trust we find our best chance for loving well 
and achieving the good.
University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill
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